Three Questions that Define Asia's FuturEFor the strength of the global economy over the next decade and for serious potential security challenges, there is no region more important than Asia. Evan Medeiros, Eurasia Group's Asia Practice Head, takes tough questions on Asia's future.
Willis Sparks: If you're one of China's neighbors, what scares you more: Very Strong China or Very Weak China? Why?
Evan Medeiros: A very strong China scares you more. For its neighbors, China is big and getting bigger (even as growth slows), it is close by, and Xi Jinping has demonstrated a willingness to throw China's weight around. In short, a very strong China poses a greater number of economic and security challenges than a very weak one.
As China's economy has grown in the last three decades, China has emerged as the top trading partner for most Asian nations, even as Chinese investment in Asia remains limited. The resulting network of regional trade ties has created both a real and a perceived sense of dependence on China for growth. Dependence is strategically uncomfortable, especially if China grows stronger. Many fear China will use this economic leverage when countries disagree with Beijing, including by imposing sanctions. That doesn't bode well for Asian countries seeking to preserve their strategic autonomy. Also, as China's economy expands, it may have greater ability to set the economic “rules of the road” in ways that favor China alone.
On national security issues, the anxiety among China's neighbors is even greater. A very strong China with a highly capable military has a greater ability and willingness to use that military to defend its interests. China's behavior in the East and South China Seas worries many in the region, even non-claimants. Its expansive claims, increased naval and coast guard presence, and its extensive land reclamation is seen as a leading indicator of China's intentions as a rising power. For many in Asia, a very strong China is more likely to use its military power to advance its strategic interests.
Finally, many in Asia worry that a very strong China could spark a security competition with the United States. The U.S.-China relationship is already trending in that direction. China's neighbors don't want to get drawn into this strategic rivalry and, thus, be forced to choose between Washington and Beijing. That's the strategic nightmare most Asian nations want to avoid.
Sparks: If/when North Korea implodes, what's the likeliest outcome: A costly and complex Korean reunification or creation of a new North Korean state that's essentially a Chinese satellite? Is there another likely alternative?
Medeiros: I think the answer requires a “when” North Korea implodes rather than an “if.” While I certainly cannot predict when this might occur, I am confident that no one can (even though many will probably claim in retrospect to have done so). Implosion will likely come out of the blue, rather than due to a gradual deterioration, and it will probably be triggered by unforeseen political events within Kim's inner circle.
So “when” it happens, the most likely outcome will be a costly and complex reunification process. Why? First, Seoul and Washington (more than an ambivalent Beijing) will see this as a golden opportunity to reunify the Korean Peninsula and bring an end to the Cold War in Korea. They (especially South Korea) will push hard for reunification, in part to avoid the creation of a new North Korean state, especially one more aligned with China.
Second, Washington's and Seoul's concerns about the North's nuclear and missile programs will drive them to move into Pyongyang as soon as they can (after it all falls apart) to get their hands on all WMD-related goods, equipment and technologies. This will become a
global nonproliferation imperative and it will drive the immediate actions of the US and ROK militaries. This imperative and the related actions of the US and South Korea (e.g., troops sprinting to Pyongyang) put up immediate barriers to creation of a new North Korea with strong ties to China.
Third, Beijing is unlikely to be prepared or willing to re-create - let alone nurture - a new North Korean client state. Beijing doesn't have a ready leadership candidate waiting in the wings; Kim's exiled family members aren't interested or capable. After implosion, Beijing will likely be focused on managing a major humanitarian crisis on its northeastern borders, not on nation-building. Beijing is also increasingly dismissive of the value the “buffer-state” theory holds for China. Xi and many of his advisors see the North as a net-negative for China in Asia. The raw cost of sustaining a new North Korean state is one that the Chinese leadership is unwilling to bear.
This will be a very messy and unpredictable process. The implosion of North Korea will open a Pandora's box of strategic questions. Who will get control of North Korea's nukes and missiles? Will Chinese troops coordinate with ROK and US troops operating north of the 38
th parallel? If reunification proceeds, what is the fate of the US-ROK alliance and US troops on the Korean peninsula?
Sparks: For the region's future, what is Asia's most important bilateral relationship that doesn't include China? Why?
Medeiros: Good question, but I can't choose just one. The answer has to be both the US-Japan and US-ROK relationship. (I firmly believe that the US should be considered an Asia-Pacific nation.) These two bilateral relationships (as well as trilateral interactions) are critical to maintaining regional security and prosperity; a major and sustained deterioration in either of these bilateral relationships (as well as in Japan-ROK relations) would be very destabilizing for Asia.
The US, Japan, and the ROK are significant drivers of growth in Asia and globally. All three countries are active in institutions that shape global trade and investment trends, such as the G7, G20 and APEC. If the US Senate ratifies TPP, the US and Japan will only become more central to trade and investment across the Pacific; South Korea is well positioned to join in the second round of TPP.
In diplomatic terms, the US, Japan and the ROK largely share the same vision for maintaining a liberal order in Asia, defined by respect for peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights and democracy, rule of law and international law, freedom of navigation, and relatively uninhibited trade and investment. Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington advance these principles through active participation in regional institutions and multilateralism, as well as their bilateral diplomacy.
Lastly, as key allies of the US, Japan and the ROK host more than 70,000 US troops in the region. These forces reassure our allies, deter regional aggression, position the US to respond quickly to regional crises (both traditional and non-traditional security challenges), and play an important role in the US military's global defense posture.
