Eurasia Group | America First, Syria Forgotten? Trump and the Middle East
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America First, Syria Forgotten? Trump and the Middle East

Eurasia Live
2 December 2016
asd The House of Lords chamber in London, Britain September 5, 2016. REUTERS/Kirsty Wigglesworth/Pool
a trump administration will likely curb u.s. support of syrian rebels Last week, Eurasia Group's London-based Middle East and North Africa director Ayham Kamel had the honor of testifying before the House of Lords, the all-appointed Upper House of the British Parliament.  Kamel briefed the House's International Relations Committee on how power in the Middle East has evolved over the last decade. Eurasia Group Global Macro director Willis Sparks recently caught up with Kamel to discuss his testimony and how a President Trump administration will affect MENA politics.

WILLIS SPARKS: What is it like to testify before the House of Lords? What was your central message for them about Donald Trump and his Middle East policy?
 
AYHAM KAMEL: It was absolutely exciting. The House of Lords International Relations Committee was investigating a timely topic: the transformation of power in the Middle East over the last decade, and its members promised a rich conversation. These appointments in the Upper House only come after extraordinary achievements or contributions to society.
 
Lord Howell of Guildford kindly invited me to sit at the table facing him with other members sitting along a horse-shoe shaped table. I had to refer to Lord Howell as “my Lord Chairman” which was strangely less bizarre that I expected. The more traditional setting is formal but certainly not uncomfortable. The room was incredibly quiet with the members razor-focused on every minute detail of the testimony.

Unlike U.S. Congressional hearings, which can be closer to a confrontation of assertions and facts, members of the House of Lords appeared interested, inquisitive, and engaged. That's partly because none of them need the platform for reelection or positioning. I appreciated that the questions reflected a deep understanding of the Middle East, British strategic interests, and the shape of global geopolitical shifts. In spite of their party affiliations, none of the members' questions reflected clear or discernable partisan biases.
 
Unlike U.S. Congressional hearings, which can be closer to a confrontation of assertions and facts, members of the House of Lords appeared interested, inquisitive, and engaged.

WS: What are the implications of a Trump administration on the MENA region? How does this affect the British national interest and its strategic priorities in the Middle East?
 
AK: While a Trump administration will certainly pursue a new line of thinking and a new decision-making process on the Middle East, the current configuration of U.S. forces in the region will not change. The military partnerships will prove stickier than political ones. In principle, Trump policies on a host of issues will probably disturb the partnership that the U.S. has had with the Gulf states for over 50 years. In many respects there will be an acceleration of Obama's reassessment of the foundations of U.S. alliances in the region.

Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump holds a bilateral meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Manhattan, New York, U.S., September 19, 2016. REUTERS/Carlo Allegri
On Syria, Trump will engage with the Russians. In Iran, he will support the government. In Libya he will support Egyptian President Abdelfattah el Sisi, and in Yemen he will accelerate U.S. disengagement from the war. These positions are in many respects far from identical from current U.K. policy. Trump's reluctance to emphasize engagement, diplomacy, and partnership will allow the U.K. to play a key role in the Middle East and North Africa. Perhaps no other power in Europe is as uniquely positioned to deepen its reach through relations with key regional powers, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia.
 
WS: We've heard reports that the Syrian government is retaking key parts of Aleppo. Is this the opposition's last stand? What role does Trump want to play, given that he has said he'd like to curtail U.S. involvement in Syria's civil war but also to destroy ISIS?
 
AK: The Syrian civil war—or regional proxy war in Syria—will not end any time soon, but the armed rebellion will most likely become a rural insurgency dominated by radicals. Trump will most likely move U.S. policy closer to Russia on the Syrian conflict and the war on ISIS. On the campaign trail, Trump was especially critical of President Obama's backing of “unknown” rebels in Syria, and Trump's nominee for director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mike Pompeo, will probably begin to roll back support for most rebel groups. Curtailing U.S. involvement in the Syrian war practically means less support for rebels, the majority of whom are Islamists. It also may mean coordinated strikes with Russia, and cooperation with the Kremlin to find a solution to the conflict. For all practical purposes the U.S. will no longer support regime change in Syria.

Syrians walk over rubble of damaged buildings, while carrying their belongings, as they flee clashes between government forces and rebels in Tariq al-Bab and al-Sakhour neighborhoods of eastern Aleppo towards other rebel held besieged areas of Aleppo, Syria November 28, 2016. REUTERS/Abdalrhman Ismail 
WS: Saudi Arabia and Iran are fighting proxy wars in various countries, but they're also seriously discussing coordination on oil output. Can they really do both these things at once? What's the state of play in their rivalry? Is Iran winning?
 
AK: The Saudi Arabia-Iran relationship is incredibly complex; it's a religious split between the region's Sunni and Shia powers, a split between the Arabs and Persians, and a competition between two powerful states for regional dominance. I do not foresee an escalation in proxy conflicts across the Middle East, in Syria, Iraq, or Yemen. Tensions will also not subside but as we have seen with Putin's mediation between the two powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran are not necessarily at war. In fact neither side wants to destabilize the other in their home territory.
 
For all practical purposes, the U.S. will no longer support regime change in Syria.

Saudi Arabia has refrained from undermining the Iranian regime in its base and the mullahs in Tehran have done the same. Iran is winning in most of the regional wars: Saudi troops failed to reinstate their allies in Yemen; Assad is still in power in Syria; and the Shia-dominated government in Iraq is on the verge of winning its war on the Islamic State. Iran and Saudi Arabia need to find a new stable equilibrium to contain tensions, but many powers must mediate to help bring about that outcome. Lavrov and Kerry did great work about a year ago to bridge the differences, but neither Tehran nor Riyadh were ready for compromise.
 
WS: What makes you most nervous about a Trump administration's impact on the Middle East? What are you most optimistic about?

Houthi rebels parade during a rally held to mobilize fighters for battles against government forces, in Sanaa, Yemen December 1, 2016. REUTERS/Mohamed al-Sayaghi TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY
AK: Uncalculated escalation and miscommunication. Trump is interested in making the most of U.S. power for Americans while refraining from launching new wars. He will not immediately rip up the nuclear agreement with Iran, or abandon the Sunni allies in the Gulf, or even shut U.S. bases in the region. I am worried that the new Trump team might confront difficulties in day to day management of complex affairs in the region, demanding partners, and nervous foes. The devil is in the details.

A Trump partnership with Egyptian president Abdelfattah el Sisi can be one of the hallmarks of U.S. policy in the region and could prove extremely stabilizing. The two leaders agree on the need to confront Islamist groups, radical and conservative, and empower secular forces. The policy might be to help put pressure on the rise of Islamism in the Middle East, ease sectarian tensions, and contain the rise of non-state actors. Egypt is also uniquely positioned to mediate and help rebuild cooperation between the Arab states. Egyptian diplomacy is a much needed good these days. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are all involved in regional wars. Egypt is not.
 
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Ayham Kamel leads coverage of regional geopolitics, Iraq, and the Levant area (Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon). His worked focuses on the US role in the Middle East, Iran-Saudi Arabia relations, energy policy, the Islamic State, and risks of financial instability in the region.
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